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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS, INC.
a Maryland non-profit
corporation; CHRIS ALLEN; and#
RICHARD ANDREWS,

Case No. 91-0387

Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.
JAY B. TAGGART, Utah State
Superintendent of Public
Instruction,
Defendant/Appellee

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
THE HON. TIMOTHY R. HANSON, JUDGE PRESIDING
(Trial Court Case No. CV-91-090-2848)

THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS, SOCIETY OF SEPARATIONISTS,
INC., CHRIS ALLEN AND RICHARD ANDREWS, (collectively hereinafter "the Society"), by and through their counsel of
record, BRIAN M. BARNARD and JOHN PACE submit the following
Reply Brief in further support of their appeal and in
response to issues raised by appellee in his recent brief.
1

RECORD ON APPEAL
At more than point in his brief, the defendant, Jay
Taggart, the former Utah State Superintendent of Schools
(hereinafter "the Superintendent") claims that the Society
filed no response in the court below to the Superintendent's
Motion to Dismiss and supporting memorandum.1

The

Superintendent makes this assertion despite the fact that
his counsel received a copy of the Society's opposition
memorandum and filed a pleading objecting to the Society's
opposition memorandum being untimely filed in this matter.
T.R. p. 31-32.

While the index of the record on appeal does

not currently include the Society's opposition memorandum,
the computer entries of the Third Judicial District Court in
and for Salt Lake County indicate that the trial court
clerk's office did indeed receive the Society's memorandum
on July 8, 1991. The Society has written to the Clerk's
Office of the Third Judicial District Court, requesting that
this oversight be corrected and that the memorandum be
included in the record on appeal.

1

This request (a letter of

Whether plaintiffs filed a memorandum in opposition
to defendant Superintendent's motion to dismiss is of little
moment. With or without a memorandum in opposition to
defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial court must still
objectively examine the complaint and determine its validity
under Rule 12 (b), tft.R.Civ.Pro.
2

August 26, 1992) is attached as Exhibit "L". Thus, the
Society's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss was
filed with the Third District Court before Judge Hanson
ruled in this case and was received by counsel for the
Superintendent in time for him to object to the lateness of
the filing.

That Memorandum is part of the pleadings in

this case and should be incorporated as part of the record
for appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Characterizing this appeal as a review of purely legal
questions —
—

dismissal for lack of standing or for mootness

the Superintendent appropriately confirms that this Court

need not defer to the lower court's ruling.

Curiously, the

Superintendent adds that where the lower court had made
factual determinations, this Court must apply the
substantial evidence standard on review.

However, in the

present case, there are no factual determinations to which
this Court must defer.

Because the Society's claim was

dismissed under Rule 12(b)2 of the Utah Rules of Civil

2

The grounds for the lower court's dismissal of this
case are unclear. While the judgment does grant the
Superintendent's motion to dismiss, the ruling could be
based on a 12(b)(6) motion — a failure to state a claim, or
3

Procedure, any conclusions in the lower court are
necessarily conclusions of law.

Standing and mootness are

strictly legal questions while procedural law clearly
establishes that for the purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal —

no factual disputes are reached.

Instead, the

facts must be construed in a manner most favorable to the
plaintiff.
The Superintendent also fails to recognize the
particularly lenient standard to review a judgment granting
a motion to dismiss:

"When challenging a dismissal under

Rule 12(b)(6) [Utah Rules of Civil Procedure] the appellant
is entitled to a generous standard of review."

Olson v.

Park-Craicr-Olson, Inc. . 167 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 20 (Utah Ct.
App. 1991),

P.2d

, citing

Arrow Industries v. Zions

First National Bank. 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988)
(Dismissal for failure to state a claim appropriate only
"where it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would
not be entitled to relief under any state of facts which
could be proved in support of its claim.") (emphasis added).
To determine the propriety of dismissal under Rule 12
(b)(6), the reviewing court must "accept the factual

upon lack of standing or a finding of mootness which can be
considered jurisdictional issues.
4

allegations in the complaint as true and consider them and
all reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light
most favorable to the plaintiff."

Coleman v. Utah State

Land Board. 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990).

Whether a trial

court properly granted a motion to dismiss is a question of
law to be reviewed under a correctness standard; the trial
court,s ruling is given no deference.

St. Benedict's Dev.

v. St. Benedicts's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)
Regardless of the grounds for dismissal of this case,
this Court owes no deference to the conclusions of the trial
court.

In addition to applying a generous standard of

review to the Society's claims, this Court must assume the
truth of all factual allegations in the complaint and must
make all reasonable inferences which favor the plaintiffs'
claims.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the purposes of this appeal of a Rule 12(b)(6),
Ut.R.Civ.Pro. dismissal, this Court must accept the material
allegations of the Society's complaint as true and must
indulge all reasonable inferences in the Society's favor.
Arrow Industries, 767 P.2d at 936.

Therefore, any opposi-

tion or attempt at contravention by the Superintendent to
5

the factual allegations contained in the Society7s complaint
is inappropriate.

By filing a motion to dismiss, the

defendant "admits" all of the facts in plaintiff's complaint
contending that even if proved the facts do not establish a
cause of action or claim.

Necessarily, the defendant

forfeits the opportunity to contest factual allegations in
the complaint.
In addition, because a Rule 12(b)(6) judgment is a
ruling on the pleadings, a reviewing court is not troubled
with whether evidence exists to support the allegations in
the complaint.

Instead, the court is concerned with whether

there is some set of facts which the plaintiff can
hypothetically prove to validate her claim.

Again, the

Superintendent's repeated objections in his brief to the
lack of evidence, the lack of a record and the lack of
findings of fact in this case are improper.
The Superintendent in his recent brief makes additional
"factual" assertions that are difficult to swallow.
Admitting that in July, 1990, the federal Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit affirmed a lower federal court
decision that prayer at public school graduations was
unconstitutional, the Superintendent laments that litigation
over the prayer issue in Utah meant that "public officials
6

were at the mercy of anyone who claimed a violation by
either allowing or preventing prayer."
6.

Appellee,s Brief at

With a little research, the Superintendent would have

realized that the state is under no obligation to make state
facilities available for religious worship, Abinaton School
District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Bell v. Little Axe
Independent School District No. 70, 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir.
1985) (distinction on basis of religious content in limited
forum of public schools justified under the establishment
clause), and is prevented from doing so under state law.
Utah Const. Article I, § 4.

Rather than seeking reversal of

the First Circuit position, the Superintendent could have
abided by clear Tenth Circuit and federal Supreme Court
precedent which, endorsing the Lemon test, uniformly
rejected prayer at public schools.

Edwards v. Acruillard,

482 U.S. 578 (1987); Roberts v. Madicran. 921 F.2d 1047 (10th
Cir. 1990); Bell v. Little Axe. 766 F.2d at 1402 (10th Cir.
1985) (recognizing "the special concern for religious
neutrality in the public school setting") ; see also

Jacrer v.

Douglas County School District. 862 F.2d 824, 829 fn. 9
(11th Cir. 1989) ("There is no rationale for applying this
limited, historically-based [Marsh] exception to religious
invocations that occur prior to high school football
7

games.").

To render the "Utah litigation moot," the

Superintendent needed only to halt the practice of prayer at
high school graduations.

The applicable law in Utah and in

the federal 10th Circuit would have clearly supported such a
move.

Id.
Because the Superintendent bypassed an obvious, neutral

and legal opportunity to solve his "dilemma" by terminating
the practice of prayer in Utah public schools, his support
of the Providence, Rhode Island school board appeal
represents —

that much more —

a pro-prayer stance.

Additionally, even though the Superintendent contends that
Utah took no position on the merits of the Rhode Island
case, he admits that the appeal for which taxpayer money was
allocated was a request to overrule the First Circuit's
injunction against prayer at graduation ceremonies.
Appellee's Brief at 7.

This is not a neutral stance but

out-right support for the position that prayer should be
allowed in the public schools.

Certainly, the

Superintendent did not expect the Rhode Island school board
to seek certiorari review of their case hoping that the
Supreme Court would affirm the Court of Appeals' opinion.
Therefore, despite the Superintendent's attempts to
characterize his ten-thousand dollar ($10,000.00) gift to
8

the Rhode Island pro-prayer legal campaign as neutral, the
appropriation should be recognized as an obvious expenditure
of Utah public funds to aid the practice of religious
worship in Utah's public schools as well as in the schools
of Rhode Island.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah courts are unwilling to deny deserving plaintiffs
access to and an opportunity for a hearing on the merits of
their claims. None of the Superintendent's arguments
against allowing the Society an avenue for resolution of
their claims can overcome the reluctance of the courts to
turn away a complaining party.

The Superintendent cannot

refute the Society's claims: Although, in part, technically
moot, the Society's causes of action readily fall in to the
exceptions to the mootness doctrine.

In addition, as

taxpayers, the members of the Society have standing to
assert their claims of unconstitutional appropriation of
public funds. The mere fact that the Superintendent was
able to send ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) off to Rhode
Island before plaintiffs filed this suit, does not prevent
plaintiffs from challenging his mis-conduct and seeking a
declaratory judgment as to the illegal nature of the act.
9

Finally, examination of the Superintendent's justifications for his unlawful expenditure reveal that his
arguments are unconvincing.

The detailed and absolute

language of Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution
specifically prohibits the disposal of public funds in aid
of religious exercise.

No characterization of the Super-

intendent's activities can hide the unlawfulness of his
contribution to the Rhode Island pro-prayer legal campaign.

ARGUMENT
I. The Society's Request for Declaratory Relief Requires
Judicial Attention.
The Superintendent's arguments that the plaintiffs'
claims are not properly before this Court misfire.

The

Society's request for declaratory relief raises constitutional questions and issues of official conduct of
particular importance to Utah's citizens.

The willingness

of various Utah officials to financially support proreligion litigation in Rhode Island also indicates that
their behavior is likely to be repeated.

Finally, ample

case law indicates that, as taxpayers, individual plaintiffs
and the Society have standing to challenge the unlawful
expenditure of public funds and to seek declaratory relief
even after the expenditure has been made.
10

A. The Issues Presented by the Case Before the Court are
Not Moot.
Interestingly, to argue for his position that the
Society's claim is moot, the Superintendent emphasizes that
"[t]here is nothing left for this [C]ourt to enjoin."
Superintendent's Brief at 13. This comment and others like
it ignore that the Society's complaint seeks judicial
declaration of the unconstitutionality of the
Superintendent's ten-thousand dollar ($10,000.00)
expenditure.

While the Society's request for injunctive

relief may indeed be moot, its request for declaratory
relief deserves judicial attention.3

By mis-characterizing

the Society's claim as a request for only injunctive relief,
the Superintendent avoids addressing compelling arguments
favoring a declaratory ruling on the merits of this case.
Indeed, the Superintendent fails to recognize that
analysis of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine further
indicates that the Society's request for declaratory relief
deserves judicial attention.

None of the arguments advanced

3

However, references to past promises of Utah's
public officials to become more involved in the Rhode Island
School Prayer case — issues pertinent to the issue of
injunctive relief — remain relevant in this case. The
willingness of these officials to advance religious exercise
with expenditures from the public coffers indicate that
these officials found nothing reprehensible and that similar
spending practices are likely to reoccur in the future.
11

by the Superintendent counter the Society's right to have a
hearing.

For example, by citing Hoyle v. Monson, 606 P.2d

240 (Utah 1980), the Superintendent fails to lend credence
to his position.

Rather than refusing to decide a

constitutional question because of mootness, the Hoyle Court
determined that plaintiffs lacked standing to pursue their
claims.

The Hoyle plaintiffs were challenging the

constitutionality of a filing fee required of candidates for
United States Congress as applied to impecunious candidates.
Because plaintiffs were not impecunious, the Court concluded
that they lacked standing to bring their claim.

Although

the Superintendent quotes Hoyle to support his mootness
claim, the case provides no support for this mootness
assertion.
The Superintendent further insists that "[t]he fact
that it is theoretically possible that the state may make
unconstitutional expenditures some time in the future is
irrelevant."

Appellee's Brief at 14. Quite the contrary,

that an issue is "likely to recur in a similar manner" is
exactly analysis adopted to determine when a claim, though
technically moot, is justiciable.

Wickham v. Fisher, 629

P.2d 896, 899 (Utah 1981); Kelp v. Schwendiman, 735 P.2d 413

12

(Utah 1987).4

The Superintendent wants to convince this

Court that there is no reasonable expectation that Utah
public officials will again appropriate public funds in a
manner similar —

not necessarily identical —

to this case.

At the same time, the Superintendent argues that his
expenditure was necessary because the then current federal
constitutional establishment law was not settled.

Clearly,

similar uncertainty is likely to reoccur often in the area
of religious establishment law, and Utah public officials
will be tempted again to contribute to legal campaigns which
support religious exercise.

Indeed, there was little, if

any, disagreement concerning the prohibition of prayer in
public schools —

indicating that whenever the slightest

confusion over the law exists, Utah public officials will
feign confusion and feel free to invest public funds in
securing a legal outcome favorable to religious exercise.5
4

Although the Utah Courts are not bound by the strict
"case and controversy" jurisdictional requirement of the
federal Constitution, the Superintendent attempts to bolster
his contentions with reference to federal law.
5

The weakness of the Superintendent's assertions that
future, unlawful expenditures are unlikely to occur is
evident when his reasoning is further analyzed. For
example, if the Rhode Island prayer case had been decided
differently, if graduation prayer had been allowed on the
basis of the Marsh test, then there would be ample
opportunity for Utah to become involved in all sorts of
litigation concerning prayer in public schools — litigation
13

Finally, and most importantly, if the issues in this
case are not addressed, then any similar expenditures in the
future will also be effectively immune from constitutional
challenge.

The Superintendent argues that since the money

has already been sent off to Rhode Island, he is not
answerable either for injunctive or declaratory relief.6
The Superintendent should not be able to thus hide behind
the mootness doctrine since the issues raised by his actions
would "evade review" contrary to the judicial policy of the
courts of Utah.

Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896 (Utah

1981) .7
to which it was not a party. Yet, the actual outcome of the
Rhode Island prayer case should not determine whether the
issue of the constitutionality of the Superintendent's past
expenditure.
6

The Superintendent falsely states that counsel for
the Society was informed before payment of the ten thousand
dollars ($10,000.00) was made, that the money would be sent
to Rhode Island. Appellee's Brief, p. 15. In fact, counsel
for the Society was informed for the first time, by a letter
of March 11, 1991 from Douglas F. Bates, attorney for the
State Board of Education that the money had already been
sent to Rhode Island, based upon authorization (dated
January 23, 1991) from the Attorney General to do so. This
action was filed on Law Day, May 1, 1991.
7

The Superintendent erroneous objects to the
Society's discussion of a "range of possible violations of
article I, § 4 by Utah officials." Appellee's Brief at 13.
However, the test for an exception to the mootness doctrine
must involve consideration of future events, uncertain to
occur. Ignoring strong precedent which determined that
issues almost identical those raised in the present case
14

B. Both the Society and individual Plaintiffs Have Standing
to Challenge the Superintendent's Unlawful Expenditure of
Public Funds.
The Superintendent errs when he boldly asserts that, on
the basis of Jenkins v, Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1983), the
Society lacks standing to challenge the Superintendent's
unlawful expenditures.

While Jenkins was denied standing to

contest service of Utah educators in the Utah Legislature,
the Utah Supreme Court determined that it was because
Jenkins was not a resident of a school district that adopted
or engaged in the challenge practice.

Id.

Thus, "Jenkins7

interest [was] less direct than the interest of those living
in the relevant school districts of legislative districts."
Id. at 1151. Rather than rejecting taxpayer standing to
challenge contest unconstitutional appropriations of public
funds, Jenkins upholds the practice of the Utah courts to
grant "taxpayers standing to challenge the actions of
political subdivisions for illegal expenditures and to
were indeed likely to reoccur, the Superintendent improperly
equates the notion of "similar" case to that of "identical"
case. He quotes (federal court) language that maintains
that the future cases must involve the same "complaining"
party, Appellee's Brief at 16, and then suggests that the
Superintendent will not be involved in any future unlawful
expenditures of public funds. However, the Society, not the
Superintendent is the complaining party in this case and is
very likely to become involved in future litigation over the
propriety of appropriations of public funds to aid religious
worship, exercise or instruction.
15

challenge the illegal use of public funds."

Olson v. Salt

Lake City School District, 724 P.2d 960, 962 fn. 1 (Utah
1986) (citing,
53).

among other

cases,

Jenkins v. Swan at 1152-

Therefore, there is no doubt that the individual

plaintiffs and the Society have standing as taxpayers to
bring this present action.8
The Superintendent's next argument against the
Society's right to bring this action suggests that someone,
other than plaintiffs, has a greater interest in the outcome
of this case and that the issues in this case would be
raised even if the Society were denied standing.
Brief at 18. This argument falls flat.

Appellee's

Although there are

other cases, to which the Society is a party, that deal with
the constitutionality of prayer in certain public settings,
these cases do not address, more than indirectly, the
propriety of the unlawful expenditure of public funds in the

8

Although the Society itself is tax exempt, its
members clearly pay taxes to the State of Utah.
Organizational standing is based upon the injury to its
members, not to the organization itself. Sierra Club v.
Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972). In addition, even cursory
examination of plaintiffs' complaint indicates that
plaintiffs did indeed make allegations of individual harm.
Complaint 5 12 - 18.
16

context of litigation to which Utah is not a party.9

Unless

the Society is granted standing, the state constitutional
restraints upon this activity will remain unresolved.
The Superintendent's odd suggestion that the Society
has a greater interest than itself, is also unconvincing.
Appellee's Brief at 19. The Superintendent suggests that
because other litigation in which the Society is involved
raises an issue similar to that raised herein, that the
issue should be resolved in the other litigation rather than
in this case.

Id.

Certainly, the Society has an equal

interest in pursuing each of its claims pending in various
Courts.

The Society does not claim, and the Superintendent

cannot legitimately assert the Society has, a greater
interest in seeking relief from unconstitutional expenditure
of public funds in one of its cases as opposed to another.
Besides, this case has now reached the appellate level where
a decision will have broad effect.

The consideration under

Jenkins7 standing analysis of a litigant having "a greater
interest" in litigating and resolving an issue applies to
another party and not to the same party that may be
litigating a similar issue in another case.
9

In addition, resolution of the issue in this case by
this Court may aid in answering similar questions in other
litigation in which the Society is currently involved.
17

Calling his expenditure "relatively small,"

the

Superintendent contends that the issue of unlawful
expenditures is of insufficient importance to warrant
judicial attention.

The Superintendent forgets that the

constitutional prohibition of aid to religious exercise is
absolute under the Utah establishment clause and that the
authors of this provision clearly did not see any unlawful
expenditure as "relatively small." Utah Const. Article I, §
4.

In addition, our entire judicial system is built upon

the notion that illegality, especially unconstitutionality,
is never a trifling matter.

Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783

(1983) (Brennan, J. dissenting)

(no de minimis

violations of

the establishment clause); Appellant's Brief at 31-38
(discussion of establishment law of states having constitutions similar to that of Utah).
The Society has established that under the standing
analysis, they have a clear right to seek resolution of
their claims before this Court.

The Society7s complaint

clearly alleges direct, adverse impact caused to them by the
Superintendent's actions and otherwise serves as the basis
for plaintiffs7 access to this Court.

18

III. Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution Prohibits the
Superintendent From Spending Public Funds to Finance a ProPrayer Appeal.
Unquestionably, the Superintendent gave the Rhode
Island school district ten-thousand dollar ($10,000.00) to
seek a writ of certiorari and reversal of a First Circuit
injunction against prayer at public school graduations
before the United States Supreme Court —

thus, the

Superintendent violated the Utah Constitution,

None of the

Superintendent's justifications of his actions can obscure
the unlawfulness of this mis-appropriation of public funds,

A. The Society Cannot be Faulted for Failure to Build a
Record in its Appeal of a Judgment on the Pleadings.
Oddly, the Superintendent urges that dismissal by the
trial court was appropriate in this case (and apparently
dismissal by this court would be similarly appropriate)
because the Society "did not support its allegations with a
hearing, record or other factual basis." Appellee's Brief
at 21. As established above, a motion to dismiss does not
involve the presentation of or adjudication of facts.
Instead, in reviewing a dismissal on the basis of a Rule
12(b) motion, the court is restricted to a ruling on the
pleadings and must assume the factual allegations in the

19

complaint to be true. Arrow Industries, supra,

767 P.2d at

936.
Nonsensically the Superintendent suggests that in the
absence of "factual support for the Society's claims," this
Court should "presume that the lower court's decision
[granting the Superintendent's motion to dismiss] is correct
and so affirm."

Appellee's Brief at 23. Necessarily, a

motion to dismiss does not rest on factual support, Id.
(motion to dismiss appropriate only when there is no set of
provable facts to support plaintiff's claim), and this Court
owes no deference to conclusions by the lower court
concerning legal questions.
245, 247 (Utah 1988).

Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d

If this Court over rules the motion

to dismiss granted below, but decides that disputed facts
prevent a ruling on the merits, this Court should remand the
case to the lower Court for necessary factual determinations.

In the mean time, the Society's "mere [factual]

allegations" are presumed to be true10 and the Society is
not obligated to bolster its case with* evidence for its
claims, either now nor before the trial court.
10

Alternatively, this Court could decide that because
the resolution of this case does not depend upon disputed
facts, a ruling on the merits is appropriate. Only at that
point would the complaint no longer be construed in a light
most favorable to the Society.
20

B. Undisputed Facts Readily Indicate that the Superintendent's Financial Support of Prayer in Public Schools
Violates Article I, § 4 of the Utah Constitution.
Next, the Superintendent insists that his ten-thousand
dollar ($10,000.00) gift to the Rhode Island school district
did not violated the Utah Constitution.

He contends that

neither the purpose nor the effect of his actions was to
promote prayer at high school ceremonies.
reasons, these assertions lack merit.

For several

Despite the

Superintendent's claims of neutrality, his substantial
payment to the Rhode Island school district, enabling the
defeated to contest the First Circuit's refusal to allow
prayer in public schools, represents deliberate support of
religious exercise.

Even more evident, the Superintendent's

expenditure had the effect of unconstitutionally promoting
religious exercise.
ishment law —

Importantly, even under federal establ-

less demanding than the strict provisions of

the Utah Constitution —

government action which has either

the effect or the purpose of promoting religion is
impermissible.

Under both the purpose and effect analysis,

the Superintendent's support of the prayer in public schools
is unlawful because it fails to comply with the state's
affirmative obligation to "pursue a course of complete
neutrality toward religion."

Wallace v. Jaffree. 472 U.S.
21

38, 60 (1985); Lemon v. Kurtsman, 403 U.S. 602, 619 (1971)
(confirming the affirmative nature of the state duty toward
neutrality and non-endorsement).
Interestingly, to argue for the neutrality of his
actions, the Superintendent contends that "had the writ [of
certiorari in the Rhode Island case] been denied the Utah
cases would have continued at great expense and detriment of
the public schools."11 Appellee,s Brief at 27. This
comment ignores that if. certiorari had not been pursued in
the Rhode Island case, previous United States Supreme Court

11

The Superintendent continually paints a misleading
picture of the "chaos" in federal and state courts in Utah.
He argues that prudence required that he financially assist
Providence in its crusade to gain approval of prayer in high
schools. Only this measure, he insists, would bring "order
to a chaotic situation." Appellee's Brief at 24. However
to effectuate a legal and guaranteed method for ending
litigation in these courts, the Superintendent only needed
to stop the practice of allowing prayers at graduations and
other ceremonies in Utah's public schools. Clearly, the
state is under no obligation to provide a forum for
religious exercise. Abinaton School District v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 225-226 (1963) (soundly rejecting the
arguments that unless "religious exercises are permitted a
^religion of secularism' is established in the schools," and
that free exercise means the "majority could use the
machinery of the State to practice its beliefs"). No
litigant has ever been successful in an attempt to compel
public schools to hold public prayers. See Roberts v.
Madicran, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990) (actions taken to
avoid the violation of the establishment clause do not fail
the Lemon test). In addition, claims based on Utah
constitutional law would not be solved by any decisions in
federal law.
22

precedent, decisions in the Tenth Circuit and Utah state
constitutional law would and did clearly ban public prayer
in Utah public schools. Nothing could be gained by seeking
certiorari other than another attempt to get judicial
approval of religious exercise in public schools.
In the absence of a ruling from the United States
Supreme Court in the Rhode Island case, the Superintendent
would clearly have been guided by past precedent from the
highest court and the Tenth Circuit.

Law from both these

forums produce as conclusive a determination on the issue of
prayer in Utah schools as a Supreme Court decision in the
Rhode Island case.
Recently, the United States Supreme Court confirmed
that the three-prong Lemon test provides the only appropriate scheme to analyzes establishment challenges to
religious activity in the public schools.

The Court

concluded that "[t]he Lemon test has been applied in all
[establishment clause] cases since its adoption in 1971,
except in Marsh v. Chambers" and the historical approach
adopted in Marsh "is not useful in determining the proper
roles of church and state in public schools . . . ."
Edwards v. Acruillard. 482 U.S. 578, 107 S.Ct 2573, 2577
(1987).
23

The Superintendent's argument is as implausible as the
contention that a financial contribution to a political
candidate, "merely intended to insure that the individual
gains access to the ballot," is a neutral act.

Certainly, a

contributor could claim that she was not biased toward the
candidate whom she sponsored, insisting that she was only
interested in "resolving" the election.

Any one confronted

with this argument would insist any such payments necessarily support the chosen candidate over the opposition.
Similarly, payment to the Rhode Island school board to
support its litigation and its goals could not be neutral.
The school district was seeking judicial approval of its
practice of allowing prayer at public school graduations.
In its petition for certiorari —
part by Utah taxpayers —

a document financed in

the school district did not

maintain a neutral stance but instead argued aggressively
for prayer.

This pro-prayer position was obviously

anticipated by the Superintendent.

Certainly, the

Superintendent could not expect the Rhode Island school
board to be neutral.

The structure of the adversarial

judicial system entails that the Rhode Island school
district defend its prayer practice through every avenue
available.
24

Whether under an effect analysis or a purpose analysis,
the Superintendent's actions were unconstitutional.

His

attempts to characterize his pro-prayer appropriation as
neutral do not hide the clearly biased nature of his
contribution.

The Superintendent spent public funds to help

the Rhode Island school board appeal an injunction against
prayer at public school graduation ceremonies.

The purpose

and the effect of this expenditure was to gain judicial
approval of religious exercise in schools nationwide.

CONCLUSION
The arguments in the Superintendent's Brief have failed
to lend credence to his attempts to avoid a ruling on the
propriety of his aid/gift to the Rhode Island pro-prayer
legal campaign.

That issue is not moot.

The Superintendent

has offered no convincing arguments to weaken the Society's
claim that this action, although, in part, technically moot,
deserves judicial attention.

In addition, he ignores that

the Utah Courts have long been open to taxpayers.

Given the

reluctance of the Utah Courts to deny plaintiffs a forum for
resolution of their claims, the Society has a clear right to
a hearing on the merits of this case.

2J5

The Society's request

for declaratory judgment is not moot and should have been
considered by the trial court.
Finally, the Superintendent has not successfully
countered the Society,s claim that the Rhode Island gift was
an unconstitutional expenditure of public funds.

Rather

than incidental and ancillary, the illegal appropriation of
educational funds was direct financial aid in support of
religious exercise and should be declared a violation of the
Utah Constitution.
Wherefore, the decision of the trial court should be
reversed.

This Court should enter a judgment granting the

Society the relief they requested, declaring the Superintendent's appropriation unconstitutional under Article I,
§ 4 of the Utah Constitution.
Dated this 4th day of SEPTEMBER, 1992.
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EXHIBIT 'L'

RE:

AUGUST 26, 1992
LETTER FROM BRIAN M. BARNARD
TO CLERK, THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
PLEADING MISSING FROM RECORD ON APPEAL
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UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
214 East Fifth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3204
(801)328-9531 —328-9532
Attorneys
John Pace
Brian M. Barnard

August 26, 1992

Alice Wong
Court Clerk
Third District Court
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Re: Chris Allen v. Taggart Case No, 910902848
Supreme Court Case No. 92-0233
Dear Ms, Wong:
A pleading filed on July 8, 1991 in the above mentioned
case has not been entered onto the court's index in the file
which is now on appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. However,
the pleading has been entered into the computer which
indicates that it was filed on July 8, 1991. ' The name of
the pleading is Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Motion
to Dismiss.
Please correct the index to include this pleading. The
presence of that pleading in the file has been raised as an
issue in the pending appeal. It is imperative that the
index accurately reflect that the pleading was filed.
If there are any questions please let me know.
you for your assistance.

BMB/sj

cc:

John McAllister
Asst. Attorney General
Geoffrey Butler
Clerk, Utah Supreme Court

Thank

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed four (4)
true and correct copies of the foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF
APPELLANTS to:
R. PAUL VAN DAM
JOHN s. MCALLISTER

Attorneys General
Beneficial Life Tower
3 6 South State
Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
on the 4th day of SEPTEMBER 1992, postage prepaid in the
United States Postal Service,
UTAH LEGAL CLINIC
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

asb\sostag. scr\soscase\bmb
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